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By democracy, I do not mean the simulacra offered by Joseph Schumpeter, with its
reduction of popular voice to a brief choice between pre-defined alternatives.1 I mean
VRPHWKLQJFORVHUWRZKDW5REHUW'DKOFDOOHG³SRO\DUFK\´DUHJLPHZKRVHLQVWLWXWLRQVDQG
procedures are intended to sHFXUH³FRQWLQXLQJUHVSRQVLYHQHVV. . . to the preferences of its
FLWL]HQVFRQVLGHUHGDVSROLWLFDOHTXDOV´2 Many of us might want to go even further, and
ask what it takes to sustain a regime in which the people are regularly engaged in
deliberating and making authoritative decisions on public issues.
Any persuasive answer will surely stress the importance of institutions. The dangers
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of majority tyranny, for example, have prompted considerable innovation in constitutional
design, while electoral and party reformers regularly offer prescriptions for enhancing
YRWHUV¶DELOLW\WRPDNHFKRLFHVKROG leaders accountable, and determine public policy.3
%XWQRWHYHQGHPRFUDF\¶VPRVWSDUVLPRQLRXVWKHRULVWVKDYHEHOLHYHGWKDWLQVWLWXWLRQVZHUH
enough. Indeed, most have argued that democracy places at least some additional demands
RQ³WKHSHRSOH´LQFOXGLQJVRPHEDVLFOHYHORISROLWLFDONQRZOHGJHUDWLRQDOLW\DQGFLYLF
engagement.4
The four books reviewed here each offer distinct perspectives on this question.
James 6)LVKNLQ¶VDemocracy When the People Are Thinking makes a powerful argument
IRU³GHOLEHUDWLYH GHPRFUDF\´ Democracy and Dysfunction is an extended conversation
between two of the most important figures in American constitutional law, Sanford
Levinson and Jack M. Balkin, as they engage with the last tumultuous few years and
continue a long-running debate over the nature, causes, and possible solutions to the
G\VIXQFWLRQV RI $PHULFDQ GHPRFUDF\ .HLWK - %\EHH¶V How Civility Works is a
philosophical engagement with this paradoxical concept, detailing its centrality to
democratic life. )LQDOO\ -HIIUH\ . 7XOLV DQG 1LFROH 0HOORZ¶V Legacies of Losing in
American Politics offers a provocative analysis of American political development,
UHFRYHULQJ WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI VXFFHVVLYH ³DQWL-PRPHQWV´ LQ $PHULFDQ KLVWRU\ ZKHQ
political movements, in losing, laid the foundations for ultimate success.
WHEN THE PEOPLE ARE THINKING
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3. David A. Bateman, Majority Tyranny, 53 TULSA L. REV. 179±89 (2018).
4. SCHUMPETER, supra note 1, at 294±95; JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY WHEN THE PEOPLE ARE
THINKING: REVITALIZING OUR POLITICS THROUGH PUBLIC DELIBERATION 6 (2018).
5. FISHKIN, supra note 4, at 7.
6. Id. at 69.
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-DPHV6)LVKNLQLVDPRQJWKHZRUOG¶VOHDGLQJH[SHUWVRQGHOLEHUDWLYHGHPRFUDF\D
concept he has tried to bring into practical reality through the approach he pioneered (and
trademarked), Deliberative Polling. Democracy When the People Are Thinking begins
with a defense of deliberative democracy, critiquing what he terms the party competition
model of democracy for its failure to provide a meaningful opportunity for public willformation. Fishkin usefully reduces many of the difficulties of democratic politics to a
choice between political equality, mass participation, and public deliberation, arguing that
for the most part democrats have been forced to sacrifice one of these goals in exchange
for the other two. For example, a democratic politics organized around relatively
programmatic parties competing in universal suffrage elections approximates the first two
values, but at the expense of the third.5
7KH FRUH RI WKH ERRN LV IRXQG LQ WZR SDUWV ³0DNLQJ 'HOLEHUDWLRQ 3UDFWLFDO´ DQG
³5HLPDJLQLQJ'HPRFUDWLF3RVVLELOLWLHV´7KHILUVWLVDVHULHVRIFDVH-studies, most of them
co-authored, detailing the experiences they have had with Deliberative Polls around the
world. Deliberative Polls are efforts to practically institutionalize the ancient technique of
randomly sampling citizens to serve in deliberative assemblies, creating a counterfactual
example of what the public would think if it could do so under favorable conditions.6 The
criteria they are evaluated by include demographic representativeness, attitudinal
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Id. at 69±70.
Id. at 140±42.
Id. at 142±43.
FISHKIN, supra note 4, at 143±46.
Id. at 146±48.
Id. at 205.
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representativeness, and sample size²essential if they are going to be a representative
microcosm²plus the opportunity for participants to engage arguments from all sides, to
gain knowledge, and to change their opinions.7 Two additional criteria are essential for
evaluating the quality of deliberation, namely whether distortions in the dialogue were
avoided and whether the post-deliberation judgments are rooted in identifiable reasons.
0XFKRIWKHERRN¶VHPSLULFDODQDO\VLVIRFXVHVRQDVVHVVLQJKRZZHOO'HOLEerative Polls
measure up to these standards. While at times the discussion can be repetitive, it adds up
to a compelling demonstration of the possibility of meaningful deliberation.
³5HLPDJLQLQJ 'HPRFUDWLF 3RVVLELOLWLHV´ LV DQ H[WHQGHG DUJXPHQW WKDW WKHVH
approaches can be scaled up, supplementing existing liberal democratic institutions in the
hopes of eventually creating an integrated deliberative democratic system. Fishkin defends
the polls against four common critiques of deliberative democracy: (1) there will be an
inevitable domination of dialogue by the more advantaged 8; (2) deliberation will create a
polarization of opinion9; (3) citizens are simply not competent to fulfill the expectations
of them10; and (4) perhaps most critically, that there will be an inevitable gap between
these microcosms and the broader public they are supposed to adequately represent. 11
The book offers a useful overview of different contemporary theories of democracy,
and its commitment to a robust conception of democracy²and )LVKNLQ¶V IXQGDPHQWDO
belief in human capacity for collective dialogue²is truly inspiring. At a minimum, the
reader is likely to be persuaded that processes such as deliberative polling can, and should,
become a more important aspect of contemporary democratic life.
And yet one is left with the suspicion that something is missing. Consider two
seemingly minor items in the deliberative process, the role of experts and moderators in
facilitating discussion and the issue agenda that the microcosms are invited to deliberate
on. For the most part, the issues are set in advance and the citizen forums are simply asked
to consider competing proposals, with expert advocates on hand to answer their questions
and provide them basic factual information. While Fishkin is aware of the importance of
citizens setting the agenda themselves, a practical mechanism for their doing so is never
fully fleshed out, at least not beyond abstract proposals to integrate a so-called
³GHOLEHUDWLRQGD\´ZLWKD1DWLRQDO,VVXHV&RQYHQWLRQLQto a revised primary and general
election cycle.12 While intriguing, this proposal seems, in a context of heightened
polarization, more than a bit utopian.
Similarly, while the central role of experts and moderators in deliberative polling
seems eminently reasonable, it also points to the difficulties of scaling up these forums in
any politically contentious environment. The more important these proceedings become
to actual policymaking, the more likely it is that those whose interests will be affected will
try to game the process (the political parties not least among them). So long as these are
local and relatively small-scale affairs, the experts and moderators can be relied on to be
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balanced and honest and to not tip the scales. If we make these procedures central to
democratic government, however, they will also need to be made responsive to political
actors, which under polarized conditions will provide these actors with an interest and
ability to manipulate the process.
Fishkin is aware of the difficulties but invites us to think beyond them. At its most
idealistic, one can even imagine how the integration of such processes into the rhythms of
our political life might mute our collective antagonisms. But it is difficult to shake the
suspicion that deliberative democracy, on a mass scale, might only be feasible if the
conflicts incipient to democracy have been sufficiently tamed, such that a broadly shared
respect for fair institutions and procedures can be taken for granted.
A REPUBLIC (MAYBE) IF YOU CAN KEEP IT

SANFORD LEVINSON & JACK M. BALKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DYSFUNCTION 81 (2019).
Id. at 18±19.
Id. at 51±61.
Id. at 67, 70.
Id. at 74.
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6DQIRUG /HYLQVRQ DQG -DFN 0 %DONLQ¶V YROXPH LV VLPLODUO\ FRQFHUQHG ZLWK
institutional reforms that might enhance American democracy. But while Fishkin is
primarily interested in deepening democratic politics beyond the narrow limits of party
compeWLWLRQ/HYLQVRQDQG%DONLQDUHDQ[LRXVO\ZRUULHGWKDWHYHQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶QRQGHOLEHUDWLYHIRUPRIGHPRFUDF\PLJKWEHDWULVN³RXUJRDO´ZULWHV%DONLQVKRXOGEHWR
³GHIHQGWKHUHSXEOLF´13
:ULWLQJLQDQHSLVWRODU\IRUPWKHDXWKRUVSUREHHDFKRWKHU¶s arguments across six
chapters and seventeen letters. The first set were written between September and
November 2015, before Donald Trump but well after many of the core dysfunctions of
$PHULFD¶VFRQWHPSRUDU\SROLWLFVKDGEHFRPHDSSDUHQW2UPD\EHQRWIRr at least initially
%DONLQUHIXVHVWRDFFHSW³G\VIXQFWLRQ´DVWKHULJKWZRUGDUJXLQJDJDLQVW/HYLQVRQ²who
URRWVG\VIXQFWLRQLQWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ¶VPDQ\XQGHPRFUDWLFIHDWXUHV²that what looks like
G\VIXQFWLRQ LV DFWXDOO\ HYLGHQFH RI D WUDQVLWLRQ EHWZHHQ ³SROLWLFDO UHJLPHV´14 If the
underlying problem is the Constitution, then it will require the nearly impossible task of
Article V amendments. If, as Balkin claims, the problem lies in aspects of the
FRQVWLWXWLRQDORUGHUWKDWDUHVHSDUDWHIURPWKH³KDUGZLUHGFRQVWLWXWLRQ´²and in particular
the possibility that we are at a moment in time when the old Reagan coalition is cracking
up but a new dominant regime is not yet in place²then the solution is much easier: wait
for the new regime to appear and revise, through statute and judicial reinterpretation, those
aspects of the constitutional order that still need reforming.15
Nearly a year passed before the next volley, which came as Donald Trump won the
Republican nomination for president. The authors were shocked and disgusted at this turn
of events, and the dramatic irony in reading these missives from the fall of 2016 is
palpable. Balkin by now has abandoned his insistence that dysfunction is the wrong
word²fair enough²EXWKHUHPDLQVRSWLPLVWLFWKDW³WKHIDPLOLDUVtory of the decline and
IDOORIUHSXEOLFVLVQRWGHVWLQHGWREHRXUIDWH´16 The constitutional structures so maligned
by Levinson, Balkin argues, in fact work to secure republicanism. 17 Levinson, for all his
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18. LEVINSON & BALKIN, supra note 13, at 72±73.
19. Id. at 105.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 203.
22. The form seems to have excused them of the need to fact-check their claims or substantiate them with
reference to the relevant social scientific literature. One example, among others, is the authors¶ repeated
misinterpretation of the significance of the so-called ³Hastert Rule´ZKLFKLVQHLWKHUDUXOHQRUDQLQQRYDWLRQRI
Dennis Hastert but rather a strategic use of procedural institutions by the majority party that has been a central
feature of House dynamics since the 1890s. Id. at 22.
23. LEVINSON & BALKIN, supra note 13, at 19.
24. Id. at 81.
25. Id. at 14.
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critiques of the Constitution as undemocratic, has spent his fall and early winter of 2016
urging the least democratically legitimate actors in our entire polity²the presidential
electors²to deny Trump what the hard-wired Constitution had given him, the
presidency.18
As the first year of the Trump administration grinds on, the authors increasingly
IRFXVWKHLUDWWHQWLRQRQ%DONLQ¶VQRWLRQRIFRQVWLWXWLRQDOURW³DGHFD\LQWKHIHDWXUHVRI
our system that maintain it as a healthy democracy and a healthy republLF´19 Their
diagnosis of the problem is that our political system has gradually become less democratic,
less republican, and more oligarchical.20 While continuing to differ on the degree to which
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOURWLVWKHSURGXFWRIWKH³KDUG-ZLUHG´&RQVWLWution or of the political system
more broadly, both conclude by endorsing some set of constitutional and subFRQVWLWXWLRQDOUHIRUPVWKDWZLOO³PDNH$PHULFDQGHPRFUDF\JUHDWDJDLQ´ 21
The epistolary form is an interesting choice, but it is ultimately an unfortunate one.
The letters often seem to talk past each other, while the exaggerated reactions to unfolding
events end up being superficial distractions from the more stable points of agreement and
disagreement.22 Despite these shortcomings, the dialogue raises and elaborates on several
questions of vital importance for American democracy. Levinson is surely right that the
structure established by the Constitution saddles us with grossly undemocratic and
unrepresentative institutions whose inadequacy contributes to their weak responsiveness
to public opinion and the unequal voice and deep corruption of which both authors
despair.23 And Balkin is surely right that at least some of the undemocratic features of the
Constitution have impeded authoritarianism. Because it is so difficult to do anything of
significance, it is difficult to do that.24
%DONLQ¶VFODLPWKDWG\VIXQFWLRQLVWKHUHVXOWRIDWUDQVLWLRQEHWZHHQSROLWLFDOUHJLPHV
however, amounts to a deep indictment of the US constitutional order, insofar as it suggests
that the Constitution is so poorly designed that it can only work when there is a dominant,
nearly hegemonic, political coalition, capable of substantially narrowing the scope of
policy competition and reducing one party or the other to a minor participant.
As the conversation turns more toward constitutional rot, their shared concern with
the political underpinnings of what passes for democracy in America becomes more
apparent. It is not just the Constitution, but the entire panoply of supporting institutions
and mores that seem to be rotten. And while Levinson early on acknowledges that America
³PD\ QHHG QHZ NLQGV RI FLWL]HQV UDWKHU WKDQ D QHZ &RQVWLWXWLRQ´25 the text rightfully
PDNHVFOHDUWKDWWKHIDXOWOLHVLQWKHSURYHUELDOILVK¶VKHDGLHRur political leaders, media
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executives, Supreme Court Justices, and yes, the elite legal academy26 that provide the
credentials, character references, and ideological rationales27 for our rotting governing
class. What is to be done with them is as important for the fate of American democracy as
reforming the Senate.
HELL IS OTHER PEOPLE
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26. Ryan Cooper, Brett Kavanaugh and the Corruption of the American Aristocracy, THE WEEK (Sept. 24,
2018), https://theweek.com/articles/797410/brett-kavanaugh-corruption-american-aristocracy.
27. Aziz Rana, Goodbye, Cold War, N+1 (Winter 2018), https://nplusonemag.com/issue30/politics/goodbye-cold-war/.
28. KEITH J. BYBEE, HOW CIVILITY WORKS back cover (2016).
29. Id. at 7, 9±10.
30. Stephanie Saul, Robin Pogrebin, Mike McIntire & Ben Protess, In a Culture of Privilege and Alcohol at
Yale,
Her
World
Converged
with
Kavanaugh’s,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
25,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/25/us/politics/deborah-ramirez-brett-kavanaugh-allegations.html.
31. BYBEE, supra note 28, at 15.
32. Id. at 19.
33. Id. at 68±69.
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.HLWK %\EHH¶V How Civility Works is a thoughtful examination of the function
SHUIRUPHGE\³FLYLOLW\´ZKLFKKHPDNHVFOHDUFRQFHUQVQRWMXVWLQGLYLGXDOVWDQGDUGVRI
behavior RUWKH³RQJRLQJTXHVWIRUSOHDVDQWFRPSDQ\´EXWWKHFRQWHQGLQJUXOHVRIVRFLDO
etiquette that are essential not only for living together but for governing together. 28
Civility, according to Bybee, is a code of public conduct, which like politeness,
courtesy, gallantry, and chivalry has its origins in the forms of social conduct expected of
ruling elites. Unlike these other forms, which have retained the tiresomely snobbish
coloring of their origins, civility very early on became more democratic. It was more social
WKDQFRXUWO\FRPPHUFLDOWKDQIHXGDOLQWHQGHG³WRIDFLOLWDWHFRRUGLQDWLRQLQLQFUHDVLQJO\
FRPSOH[XUEDQFRPPXQLWLHV´E\RXWOLQLQJWKH³PRVWEDVLFNLQGVRIFRQVLGHUDWLRQWKDWZH
RZHRQHDQRWKHULQSXEOLFOLIH´29 The democratizations of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, moreover, fatally undermined the capacity of our elite classes to uniquely
determine the content of this social code. Given the rot at the top, alluded to in Democracy
and Dysfunction and part of the background ambience of the Kavanaugh hearings²even
apart from the specific, credible, and numerous allegations of sexual assault 30²we should
all be grateful for their diminished, if still too great, influence in defining the standards for
civility.
As a result, however, there is no one code of elite-sanctified conduct, but instead a
FDFRSKRQRXV SUROLIHUDWLRQ ³RI GLIIHUHQW EHOLHIV DERXW FRUUHFW EHKDYLRU WKDW FUHDWHV DQ
HQYLURQPHQWDERXWFRPPRQFRXUWHVLHVWKDWGRQRWVHHPYHU\FRPPRQ´ 31 Paradoxically,
argues Bybee incisively, many instances of what seems to be incivility are in fact efforts
to establish or assert a new and different code of public conduct. Sometimes these codes,
DQGWKHDSSHDOVWR³FLYLOLW\´WKDWEDFNWKHPXSDUHSUHPLVHGXSRQ more egalitarian and
inclusive bases; but just as often they are asserted in defense of new or old hierarchies of
moral and social worthZKHUH³EHFLYLO´PHDQV³NQRZ\RXUSODFH.´32 Bybee is wholly
convincing that the apparent ³FULVLV´ RI FLYLOLW\ WRGD\ LV QRW LWV DEVHQFH, but its
proliferation.33
Bybee explores still other tensions immanent to the concept. Civility, for example,
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can be equally a mechanism for repressing dissonant voices and for facilitating egalitarian
and inclusive communication. While any particular standard of civility can be justified by
UHIHUHQFHWRVRPHWKLQJUHVHPEOLQJ ³SXEOLFUHDVRQ´ 34 their origins are usually found in
efforts to socially establish a particular hierarchy of social worth. The civility that required
African Americans to step off the sidewalk when a white person walked by was justified
by the claim that it would reduce public frictions, by requiring one set of citizens to avoid
any suggestion of equality that might antagonize the dyspeptic citizens whose status was
prioritized. This was as much a code of civilit\DVWRGD\¶VGHPDQGWKDWVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDO
elites be allowed to lecture captive audiences without any response from the audience. 35
There is nothing inherently egalitarian about civility, and quite often the opposite. 36
So why not discard it altogether?
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34. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 766 (1997).
35. Bianca Padró Ocasio, At Notre Dame, Pence Attacks Campus “Political Correctness”, POLITICO (May
21, 2019), https://politi.co/2TUg1bs; Katie Zezima, Everything is Political These Days. Even Commencement
Speeches,
WASH.
POST
(May
14,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2014/05/14/everything-is-political-these-days-even-commencement-speeches/.
36. BYBEE, supra note 28, at 39.
37. Id. at 38, 54, 58.
38. Id. at 38, 42.
39. Id. at 51, 69.
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%\EHH¶VGHIHQVHRIFLYLOLW\LVVXEWOH&LYLOLW\¶VYLUWXHOLHVLQKRZLWSURPLVHVWRUHYHDO
information about our core selves but which, precisely because it can be faked, does not
do this at all. In short, civility has always been virtue signaling, a way RI ³SURMHFWLQJ
LQWHJULW\DQGJRRGFKDUDFWHU´ZKRVHDSSHDOlies precisely in the fact that it allows us to be
³EHWWHUWKDQ>ZH@PLJKWEH´E\SUHWHQGLQJWREHEHWWHUWKDQZHDUH 37 By enabling us to
project around ourselves an aura of decency, we can feel free to advance arguments with
which people are likely to disagree, we can pretend to accept the moral worth of others
with whom we do disagree, and as a result we can all go on living together contentiously
and pluralistically and disingenuously.
The implications of civility for democratic politics are similarly subtle. Since it is
often a way of signaling social belonging, and thus of reproducing social exclusion, those
of us committed to egalitarianism should not accept just any old code of civility. We must
instead devise and model schemes of etiquette that advance genuinely egalitarian values
DQG³HQVXUHWKDWWKHHWLTXHWWHZHVHHNWRHVWDEOLVKLVILWIRUDIUHHDQGHTXDOSHRSOH´ 38
The inevitability of conflict over what the standards of civility should be points to
another implication. Because civility can shape the terms of our collective political life, it
LVLQHYLWDEO\JRLQJWREH³DVXEMHFWRISROLWLFDOVWUXJJOHDQGGHEDWH´UDWKHUWKDQVRPHWKLQJ
that can be established a priori or by appeal to authority.39 Indeed, that is what many of
the fights over political correctness tend to be about: an effort by some to render discourses
ZKLFK UHLQIRUFH FHUWDLQ KLHUDUFKLHV EH\RQG FLYLOLW\¶V SDOH DQG D FRXQWHU-reaction in
defense of different civilities that would allow those who want to retain these hierarchies
the space to do so.
These are not arguments that will or ought to be decided on procedural grounds or
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E\HPSW\DSSHDOVWR³IUHHVSHHFK´DVWKRXJKZKDWZHUHDWVWDNHZHUHQRWWKHFDSDFLW\WR
say something but the moral valuation or stigma that attaches to the act of saying it. These
are political contests over the type of codes that ought to govern our collective life, and
thereby about the vision of collective life that we wish to pursue. Not every disagreement
needs to be a battle, and not every hill is worth dying on. The stakes, however, are not
between civility and its opposite, but between different notions of social worth.
SORE LOSERS
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40. JEFFREY K. TULIS & NICOLE MELLOW, LEGACIES OF LOSING IN AMERICAN POLITICS 3±4 (2018).
41. Id. at 6.
42. Id.
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Legacies of Losing offers a provocative new synoptic perspective on American
political development, one that shifts our focus away from the winners²the Federalists,
the abolitionist Republican Party, the New Deal order²and places it squarely on the
losers²the Anti-Federalists, Andrew Johnson, and Barry Goldwater. In doing so, Tulis
and Mellow critique two distinct lines of theorizing about American political development.
The first of these emphasizes moments of transformational regime change, occurring at
³FULWLFDOHOHFWLRQV´RU³FRQVWLWXWLRQDOPRPHQWV´WKDWVHJPHQW$PHULFDQSROLWLFDOKLVWRU\
into distinct regimes or republics.40 The second perspective argues instead that the United
States, from its founding, has been characterized by a hegemonic liberalism, with much of
its political development best understood as efforts to recalibrate American institutions to
better reflect the ideals and aspirations of their liberal underpinnings. 41
Against both of these perspectives, Tulis and Mellow develop the metaphor of a
³EUDLGHGGHYHOopmental process in which liberal constitutional moments are entwined with
constitutional antimoments that sustain and ingrain illiberalisms and ascriptive
KLHUDUFKLHV´ VXFK DV ZKLWH VXSUHPDF\ WKDW VXSSRVHGO\ UXQ FRXQWHU WR WKH OLEHUDO
tradition.42 The losers focused on by Tulis and Mellow were not simply written out of a
progressively advancing liberal tradition, nor were they irrelevant protests against
successive dominant regimes. Instead, in the specific patterns of agency they revealed in
their loss, they laid the foundation for a subsequent form of success.
Tulis and Mellow start with the Anti-Federalists, who²defeated in their efforts to
structurally revise the proposed United States Constitution or prevent its ratification²
extracted a set of rhetorical concessions from the Federalists that have since become
dominant themes of constitutional interpretation. The irony of American history is that in
the pattern of their losing, the Anti-Federalists obscured the actual political logic
established by the )HGHUDOLVWV¶ FRQVWLWXWLRQ 7XOLV DQG 0HOORZ FRQYLQFLQJO\ UHFRYHU D
rhetorical pattern in The Federalist Papers: after an initial attempt at mollifying AntiFederalist fears, Publius would outline the underlying political logic of the proposed
structure in a way that entirely validated these worries. The result is a series of mollifying
sops, whether in the The Federalist or in the Constitution itself (the Tenth Amendment,
IRULQVWDQFH WKDWOHDYHWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ¶VFHQWUDOL]LQJORJLFXQWRXFKHG³7he structural
properties of the regime are much more determinative of real power than the nominal
DOORFDWLRQVRISRZHU´ZKLOHWKH³VWDWH-oriented features of the Constitution are not core or
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43. Id. at 48±49, 50.
44. Id. at 53.
45. TULIS & MELLOW, supra note 40, at 99.
46. Id. at 114.
47. They attempt to sustain this claim by appealing to the authority of Frederick Douglass, without
acknowledging the political and strategic circumstances in which Douglass was intervening. Id. at 164.
48. Id. at 60±61.
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constitutive aspects²they are peripheral to a regime whose animaWLQJORJLFLVQDWLRQDO´43
The Anti-)HGHUDOLVW¶V ZD\ RI ORVLQJ SURYLGHG UHVRXUFHV WR VXEVHTXHQW SROLWLFDO
movements to reinterpret the Constitution along the lines they preferred. Thomas Jefferson
and others would point to The Federalist and the few gestures toward state authority in the
Constitution to claim this as the defining characteristic of the Constitution. 44 The result is
that the centralizing political logic remains intact, but is overlaid with misinterpretations
WKDW KDYH ERWK FUDPSHG WKH FRXQWU\¶V political development and left us unable to
understand it.
Our next loser is Andrew Johnson, remembered today for his racism, his disastrous
efforts to reconstruct a Union in which the emancipatory potential of the Civil War was
squelched, and for his political defeat, brought about when he so polarized Republicans
that it allowed Radicals to briefly take control over Reconstruction policy. Tulis and
0HOORZFRPSOLFDWH -RKQVRQ¶VVWDWXUHDVDORVHUFUHGLWLQJKLVRZQXQVXFFHVVIXODFWLRQV
with charting a path for white southern elites to pursue in their ultimately successful efforts
to establish white supremacy and Jim Crow. 45 White supremacy naturally brings us to our
third loser, Barry Goldwater, whose 1964 presidential run was crushed under the largest
landslide since the uncontested election of 1820. For Tulis and Mellow, *ROGZDWHU¶V
defeat-in-victory was achieved through its direct legacy in fostering a dense network of
conservative activists who would organize both in and outside the Republican Party.
GoldZDWHU¶V ³UHOXFWDQFH´ DV D FDQGLGDWH OHG FRQVHUYDWLYHV WR FRQVWUXFW WKHLU RZQ
mobilizing infrastructure which, when combined with their joint appeal to white
southerners opposed to civil rights legislation, would eventually enable them to conquer
the Republican Party and usher in the Reagan Revolution. 46
These cases, however, are not equal in importance. The Anti-Federalists failed to
fundamentally alter the structure of the Constitution, but bequeathed to us a constitutional
interpretation that runs almost wholly counter to the actual intent of the founders and grates
against its actual political logic. The subsequent cases occur within this basic mental cage,
a constitutional order that the authors insist is fundamentally national and liberal (so much
so thaWWKH\VXJJHVWWKDWWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ¶VH[SOLFLWSURWHFWLRQVIRUVODYHU\PLJKWEH³EHWWHU
XQGHUVWRRGDVQHFHVVDU\IHDWXUHVRIDQDQWLVODYHU\&RQVWLWXWLRQ´ 47), but which we can only
seem to interpret as its opposite.
What implications does this story have for our opening question? One might simply
be that the potential losers of democracy and democratization²often the former elites²
need conciliating, or at least constraining, especially if they still have the resources to make
trouble. Perhaps the only way AmeULFD¶V JURVVO\GHILFLHQW GHPRFUDF\KDVVXUYLYHGDWDOO
has been because the losers could find glimmers of hope and strategies for fighting another
day. The cost, however, has been immense: a basic inability to grasp the political logic of
our institutions,48 the quotidian cruelty of conceiving of people as rugged individuals who
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are better-beggared-than-assisted,49 a conservatism that manifests itself in, and is most
energized by, the defense of ascriptive hierarchies,50 the brutal curtailing of citizenship for
African Americans, as well as open acceptance of oligarchic hegemony across much of
the country for nearly a century, 51 and the absurd marshaling of the language of liberty in
the defense of the above. With a democracy like this, who needs authoritarianism?
THE NECESSITY OF POLITICS
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49. Id. at 110.
50. TULIS & MELLOW, supra note 40, at 7±8, 123±24, 163±68.
51. Id. at 98.
52. This might seem a low bar, but the United States has tripped over it at least once in its history and some
observers worry it might do so again. LEVINSON & BALKIN, supra note 13, at 98.
53. EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND
AMERICA 260 (1989).
54. BYBEE, supra note 28, at 22.
55. TULIS & MELLOW, supra note 40, at 103.
56. Id. at 83±84.
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Precisely because democracy requires robust contestation and disagreement, it has
often been asserted that it needs some pale beyond which contestants will not cross. Such
a limiting principle to conflict has often been found in national unity52; or it has been
located in some supposed creedal consensus, perhaps embedded in a constitutional
tradition or in other such fictions. 53 The purpose, in either case, is to constrain the scope
of political conflict.
This is the backdrop whLFK)LVKNLQ¶VPRGHORIGHOLEHUDWLYHGHPRFUDF\DVVXPHVDQG
it is the consensus whose absence Balkin diagnoses DV EHLQJ DW WKH URRW RI $PHULFD¶V
dysfunctionality. And it is the very possibility of such a limiting principle that, in their
own ways, Bybee and Tulis and Mellow call into question. As Bybee argues with regard
to civility, institutions are endogenous to politics. Even if we could logically deduce a
boundary beyond which political conflict should not pass, it would command assent only
so long as it did not seriously impede the aspirations of powerful actors. Any such
boundary must be established and defended politically, a task that requires forms of
coercion both hard and soft, including sometimes repressive appeals to civility.54
%DONLQ¶V KRSH IRU a new political regime whose popular support and institutional
embeddedness would be sufficient to deter and tame serious opposition seems to be of this
same basic character. The New Deal order²like the Republican ascendancy that preceded
it and the Reagan era that followed²rested on forms of soft and hard coercion and an
elite-UHJXODWHG³FRQVHQVXV´WKDWDWWHPSWHGWRIRUFHSROLWLFVLQWRDFFHSWDEOHFKDQQHOV 55 To
root out constitutional rot, it seems, it is necessary for one of the major political coalitions
to lose decisively and to stay down. But Tulis and Mellow make clear that such attempts
to establish and sustain distinct regimes will remain inherently unstable. 56 Moreover, even
their sophisticated argument for a fundamentally liberal character to America¶V
constitution locates this liberalism in a political logic which we have ultimately lost sight
of, and concedes that at the level of discourse and supra-constitutional institutions an
ascriptive illiberalism has become an enduring feature of the American landscape. The
losers, even the anti-democratic and illiberal ones, cannot be reliably kept down in a
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democracy.
As a result, there is likely no blueprint for constructing a fully consolidated
democratic regime, for there is no mystical incantation which can forever keep politics at
bay. What, then, does it take to sustain democracy? Constant political struggle seems to
be the inevitable answer.
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